DAB
Delay Attribution Board

September 2015 DAG

Briefing Document

For the attention of all staff who are involved in the Train Delay Attribution Process

Delay Attribution Board
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INTRODUCTION

This brief supplements, and covers the key changes made within, the September 2015 DAG and also incorporates additional process and guidance documents developed by the DAB for improved understanding, application and consistency of the attribution process.

Those who attended or at least read the April 2015 DAG briefings will be aware that there were a few omissions that were highlighted including certain M, R and T codes. It should be noted that all these have now been rectified in the September DAG.

In terms of this September 2015 issue, the biggest single change is that all the sections have been re-ordered – so firstly, apologies to all those that have memorised the relevant section numbers!

The rationale behind this re-ordering is twofold:-

1) So that similar subject matters are now adjacent to each other (e.g yards and terminals) but additionally they are all in a more logical order and flow through into linked sections, hopefully providing easier referencing. This means that it is more likely that all the relevant sections are referred to when attributing or resolving incidents and there are less pages to flick through to get to any referenced sections.
2) As part of a longer term work stream that will see these similar sections combined together (so there will be fewer, but larger sections) and then spaced out in a rule book style so that, potentially in the future, the DAG could be issued more regularly but in part rather than as a whole.

For ease of reference the section number changes are shown at the end of this brief.

This brief will therefore work through the DAG by its new referencing.

Some of the changes made to the DAG are additional references to other appropriate sections (for improved usability) and other changes are cosmetic or corrections, such as amending Train Planning to Capacity Planning.

Most importantly, the DAB have been reviewing (and will continue to review) the common areas of perceived misinterpretation of the DAG or areas that seem to cause the most ‘debate’ within the Industry – be it between Operators and Network Rail or indeed internally to the individual parties. Often, many of these ‘debates’ are just about understanding the principles (that for many outside the attribution world can admittedly seem perverse at times).

Therefore you will notice throughout this brief that many of the changes are about trying to drive improved understanding. It is hoped that having some of the attribution principles set out in black and white, backed up by examples where appropriate, will hopefully go some way in reducing the amount of discussions that are occurring.

Part 1: Key changes within the September 2015 DAG

Delay Code Removal - OI

Delay Code OI has been removed from the DAG after request from Network Rail due to misinterpretation of its purpose and therefore continued inappropriate use.
(OI should only have been used for formal investigation incidents involving two or more Operators where it is not known which Operator (if any) were the responsible party – once a party has been eliminated from the inquiry their delays ONLY would then be attributed to OI pending conclusion of investigations with the other parties).
OI was commonly utilised for incidents only involving one Operator or for internal Network Rail disputes.
However, from April 2016 it is expected that the new 'Holding Code' process and related codes will be available for use which will address the requirements of the Operators in this issue. Until then FU and TU should be utilised as appropriate.

Affected sections are:-
4.42.1 Mishaps and Major Safety Incidents – OI wording element removed
Section 7O - **Network Rail Operating Causes** - OI removed
4.31.2(g) Wires Down and other OLE Problems - OI replaced by FU/TU
(Pending the Holding Code introduction in April 2016)

(Delay Codes also now removed per April 2015 Briefing are M2, R6, RN, T1, TC, TD, TE and TL)

SECTION 2: Measuring and Recording Delays

2.5.4 *(part)…However, as the need arises these will be explained and attributed to provide additional information for performance management purposes but will not feature in Performance Regime calculations. As a minimum this shall include where the below threshold delay is the prime delay or required to complete a chain of reactionary delay…*

This revised wording (in red) gives clarification of the minimum requirement of subthreshold delays to be attributed where they are needed to explain further threshold delay as well as to maintain data quality of attribution within all incidents and improve analytical capabilities. You will notice the word 'shall' which was suggested during Industry Consultation and accepted by the Board due to being considered more a necessity than a choice.

SECTION 3: Categories of TRUST Delay Code and Default Attribution

3.1.5 *All attribution should be based on, and made against, the agreed 'plan' for the day in question. For Passenger Operators this is referred to as the Applicable Timetable which is the plan as* ***agreed*** *by 22:00 on the day prior to the train's operation.*

This new paragraph is being introduced stipulating that attribution should be made to the 'plan of the day' as this is a common area of misunderstanding and misapplication. Once a plan is agreed and or uploaded into the system that is what parties should be responsible for delivering and therefore measured against.

SECTION 4: Guidance on Coding of Incidents and Contractual Responsibilities in Real Time

4.1.3 Joint Responsibility Incidents

4.1.16 *In all the circumstances in this Section 4.1, the term station should be taken to include Network Rail Managed Stations and individual platforms at a station*

This amendment (in red) is to provide clarification that platform closures are treated in the same vein as full station closure per the note in flowchart 4.27.11

Note: A further DAB work stream will see further clarification in this section for the April 2016 DAG

4.1.26 *Addition of a reactionary delay attribution example – splitting reactionary delay between two equally impacting incidents*

This example and eight others are now included in a separate Process and Guidance Note attached to the DAG, so please refer to **PGD2** for all examples (refer to Part 2 of this brief)

4.8 Adhesion Problems Including Leaf-Fall

4.8.7.1 *(Note that Safety of the Line incidents involving RHC trains are normally the responsibility of the Operator whose Safety Case the train is operating under and not Network Rail for who the trains are running).*

This is an additional note (supported by the amended 4.9.2 below) to provide clarity covering RHC responsibility for Safety of the Line incidents during the autumn season.

Note: Don't forget there is also a DAB Good Practice Guide for autumn.

4.9 Railhead Conditioning Trains

4.9.2 *Network Rail is responsible for the operation of RHC trains on the network to assist with adhesion in the autumn period. Although Network Rail contracts this work to Train Operators or other suppliers, it is Network Rail who is normally responsible for delays associated with RHC train operation. The exception to this is Safety of the Line incidents such as SPADs which should remain the responsibility of the Operator of that train.*

In the same vein as the new 4.8.7.1 above this additional wording (in red) is again providing clarity covering incidents involving RHT SPADs

However, for the avoidance of doubt, any delays caused by the failure to treat the railhead post any Safety of the Line incident involving an RHT would still remain the responsibility of Network Rail.

4.14 Operational GSM-R Systems – Faults or Failures

4.14.1 Flowchart



Amendment to the first decision box in the flowchart to cover off if the event is an agreed location or software issue. Last box now reads 'M9 pending further information' as potentially this is not always a final position.

4.14.2(o)

Amendment to show NFF GSMR is now considered NR responsibility (J0) but for final resolution reference should still be made to the NFF conditions contained within section 4.44

Note: Don't forget DAB IRG7 covering GSMR issues in more detail.

4.25 Regulation and Signalling of Trains

4.25.3 *In the event of a train being incorrectly regulated or routed as a result of a Signaller correctly applying an incorrectly-produced Train Service Simplifier, the 'Minutes Delay' should be attributed to Network Rail and coded OQ/OQ**. This coding shall apply irrespective of who created the simplifier or the source of the information. The exception is when the simplifiers produced by Capacity Planning which should be coded to (QA/QM/QQ**)*

This is an addition (in red) to the existing paragraph stipulating that simplifiers are the responsibility of the author of the simplifier and not the responsibility of where the information to compile it comes from.

4.25.6 NEW TABLE FOR EARLY RUNNING TRAINS

No.	*Circumstances*	*Delay Code*	*Incident Attribution*
a.	*Train running early and out of path (any reason) and regulating error occurs at point of delay (i.e. early train could have been held at that point causing no delay)*	*OB*	*Attribution to LOM code controlling section that regulation error occurred (OQ**)*
b.	*Train running early and out of path that could have been held at a prior regulating point where no delay would have occurred (no regulating error at point of delay)*	*OC*	*Attribution to LOM code controlling section where train could have been held* *Note – if the section is on another Route then DAG 2.6.17 applies (OQ**)*
c.	*Train running early and out of path on control agreement. (not withstanding scenario a)*	*OD*	*Attribution to go to the Control Manager that agreed running early*
d.	*Train running early and out of path due to a Driver/Shunter request that signaller agrees to (i.e. not processed through Control) (not withstanding scenario a)*	*OC*	*Attribution to LOM code controlling the 'box that allowed early running (OQ**)*
e.	*Train running early and out of path as a direct result of a known incident – e.g. diverted via quicker route. (not withstanding scenario a)*	*Prime cause incident*	*Attribution to the incident causing early running.*

This is a completely new entry as a start by DAB looking at regulating delays. Regulation of early running trains has always been a significant discussion point and this entry is borne out of internal guidance being utilised within Network Rail but was deemed appropriate to formalise it into the DAG which gives greater visibility to the wider Industry on application.

Section 4.25 continues…

4.25.7 NEW FLOW CHART FOR ARS/ACI



Similar to 4.25.6 above, this is another new addition relating to regulation issues, this time specifically covering ARS related delays. Although it wholly relates to internal Network Rail attribution it provides formal guidance that is often required but also visibility to the wider Industry as to the logic applied.
(It is also a potential starting point for future Traffic Management System regulation)

Note: A further DAB work stream may see additional clarification in section 4.25 for the April 2016 DAG

4.26 Timetable and Resource Planning Errors

4.26.1 *This section reflects the responsibility of and requirement on Network Rail to produce a validated train plan, paths and schedules for all services operating on the Network.*

4.26.2 *All schedule errors contained within TRUST are the responsibility of Network Rail. They should be validated prior to uploading. This is irrespective of Operator access requests or any incidents causing the need for revised plans or schedules to be produced. Likely circumstances and coding are as follows:*

Note: *If the delay cause is confirmed as due to the Operator's documentation not corresponding with the uploaded schedule(s) and*

- *Provided that Network Rail's response to the relevant access request by that operator was made within the timescales laid down in Part D of the Network Code and*
- *Provided that no error(s) has been introduced to the uploaded schedule(s) then:*

Code FH for freight operators and TA for passenger operators should be used.

The changes made within 4.26.1 and 4.26.2 (and the Note) have been made to improve clarity of delays relating to planning and scheduling of trains. It further highlights the responsibility on Network Rail to ensure the train plan that is uploaded is free from errors – regardless of what is requested by Access Parties and the reason for any request being needed.
For example a schedule error uploaded as a result of a contingency plan due to a line blockage should be attributed to the party (Capacity Planning or Route Control) that created / uploaded that schedule and not Operator who requested it or the line blockage incident.

4.26.2(h)

h	*Short Term Plan (STP) errors in connection with a freight schedule*	*QM*	*Network Rail (QQAK)*

The addition of this entry is predominantly for clarity to ensure that Freight STP errors are coded to the appropriate responsible manger code QQAK and not generic Planning codes to give improved visibility and analytical benefits.

4.26.7 *Where a freight train is provided with an Alternative Train Slot (VSTP) under the Management of Freight Services during disruption protocol (NCI 9.1), the cancellation of the Base Train Slot should be attributed to the TRUST delay incident created for the disruptive event that has caused the need for the Alternative Train Slot to be implemented.*

A new entry to cover VSTP scheduling when carried out under Management of Freight Services During Disruption (MFSDD), in that the original cancellation should be attributed to the prime impacting incident causing MFSDD to be initiated.

4.27 Station Operating Delays

4.27.1 *Normally, station delays are attributable to the Operator of the trains concerned and not to the station owner.*

This additional wording is to provide further clarification of the fact that station ownership does not affect responsibility of delays within attribution. Just as a reminder to parties that any financial impact / claims should be made through the Station Access Contract mechanisms.

Additionally and in the same vein, Section 7R heading and both RY and RZ delay code descriptions have been amended to read 'station operating causes' rather than 'operator'.

4.27.6 *Where a platform alternation that varies from the information shown on the CIS is made by the Signaller for no known reason, for any incurred delays resulting from passengers or industry staff getting to that train, attribution should be made to the Signaller. If the alternation is advised with sufficient time to allow mitigation then delays should be coded to the operator of the train concerned.*

4.27.7 *Where a short notice, unplanned platform alteration is made by the Signaller for a given reason any resulting delays incurred from passengers or industry staff getting to that train should be attributed to the reason for that change.*

4.27.8 *Where a short notice platform alteration is requested to, and actioned by, the Signaller any resulting delays resulting from passengers or industry staff getting to that train should be attributed to the reason for that change.*

4.27.9 *Where a pre-planned platform alteration is requested to, and actioned by, the Signaller and where the CIS could have been updated by the relevant party (regardless of station ownership) or announcements made, any resulting delays from passengers or industry staff getting to that train should be attributed to the operator of the train thus affected.*

4.27.10 *In ACI locations where a TD/berth has not been entered or correctly registered resulting in delays caused by passengers or industry staff getting to that train (either misdirected or not directed) attribution should be to the reason ACI was incorrect. This will be Network Rail Capacity Planning if the data is incorrect or systems if ACI fails.*

Emanating from a Request for Guidance and subsequent DAB Sub Group the clarification of delays relating to CIS was required. The new sections added above should now give appropriate guidance of what are considered the potential scenarios of delays relating to CIS information. As can be seen with these examples there is an interaction with section 4.25 (Regulation and Signalling of Trains) but it was believed more logical to sit within Station Operating Delays being where the delays emanate and therefore the first part of the DAG that would likely be referenced.

4.28 Infrastructure Equipment Failure

4.28.16 *The code J2 should be used for TRTS failure or circumstances where the TRTS is not registered or received in the relevant signalling control centre (where activation by dispatch staff is demonstrated)*

This is a new addition clarifying TRTS related incidents which has been another area of debate over the years.
To support this new addition it is worth noting the key element of 'demonstration' which could be considered as CCTV footage (where it exists). However, it would be expected that the TRTS would be faulted in these circumstances and therefore J2 would apply in a NFF scenario.

4.33 Planned and Emergency Possessions

4.33.13 NEW EXAMPLES

p.	*Overrun of possession due to a substandard action or inaction of a member of route operations staff. (e.g. Signallers, MOMs, LOMs)*	*I5*	*Network Rail (OQ**)*
q.	*Overrun of possession, due to the removal of staff from a worksite(s)*	*I5*	*Network Rail (IQ**)*
r.	*Overrun of possession due to a substandard action or inaction of a member of NSC operations staff*	*I5*	*Network Rail (IQAW)*

Additional examples for over runs have been added to improve clarity and to highlight three scenarios that have caused internal debate to Network Rail. Similar to ARS related delays in Section 4.25 above, having these formally covered in the DAG helps improve consistent attribution (i.e. confirming that I5 is the appropriate coding) and gives wider visibility to Industry of where responsibility should rest for such occurrences.

4.37 Fires (Including False Alarms)

4.37.7 *For the scenarios above involving fires originating in an off network yard, siding, terminal or depot, any delays caused directly to trains on the network due to the effects of the fire (cautioning or stopping traffic due to smoke, proximity of the fire itself) should be attributed to a separate XL coded incident. This would not include trains delayed waiting entry to the off network location.*

This is a new addition covering fires that occurs off, but is directly affecting, the Network Rail network.
In simple terms trains that are on the network that are prevented from going off network due to the fire should be attributed (per Operator) to the off network fire. However, if a train is delayed directly by the effect of the fire on the network (i.e unable to pass by the fire / smoke and **not** in a queue of trains) this should be attributed the responsibility of Network Rail as an 'external fire'.

(See also reactionary YT example in Process and Guidance Document 3 –Y Code Application)

The same wording from 4.37.7 is also added as a note to flowchart **4.37.8.2**

4.42 Mishaps and Major Safety Events

4.42.3 NEW EXAMPLES

j.	*Injury to member of staff in Railway Industry and unable to complete current or subsequent duties*	*Delay Code appropriate to the cause of subsequent delay (not the cause of injury)*	*Depending on whether the injury prevents the operations of the network or operation of the train(s)* *Network Rail (OQ**) or Operator of the train. (F##*/ M##*/R##*/T##*)*

This clarified entry seeks to guide the user to the cause of delay rather than the cause of the injury should a member of staff be injured.

Example 1: A member of dispatch staff that works for TOC A trips over and injures their arm and cannot complete duty. Their next task was to dispatch a train operated by TOC B. The delay to TOC B's train would be attributed to TOC B as waiting dispatch (potentially R2 or R3). For that specific dispatch duty the member of TOC A staff is 'contracted' to TOC B.

w.	*Union directive or industrial action causing un-planned delays (including non-safety issues).*	*Appropriate delay code to the function to whom the party taking action is contracted to at the time of the delay occurring*	*As appropriate to delay code and responsible party.*

Whilst any strike that could occur on the rail network is normally pre-advised and pre-planned (and thus come under DAG 3.1.5 and not cause any delay) there are potential situations whereby any Operational staff may take union directed 'un-planned' action. This could be, for example, drivers being directed to reduce speed on certain units or in certain locations or staff not carrying out certain aspects of their role.

For clarity, this does not include circumstances where the instruction comes from their respective employing company - this would be covered under TOC / FOC / Network Rail directive (FG, TR, TW, OD for example)

4.43 Safety Problems Reported by Staff or Public

4.43.2 *The principles of attribution within this section are that attribution responsibility will be to the owner of the reported fault or safety issue and NOT to the person (staff or public) that reported the issue should it be proven to be a mistaken report.*

Much debate is often had between Network Rail and Operators and indeed between internal parties when 'faults' are reported against assets (be it trains or infrastructure). This addition seeks to clarify that attribution is made to the reported fault and not the reporting person / party (regardless of whether that report was correct or not).

4.43.3 *When considering resolution of incidents utilising this section, thought should be given to the distinct difference between 'no cause found' for an identified fault and 'no fault found' for a reported fault. For No Fault Found concerning technical incidents please refer to section 4.44.*

In a similar vein to the amendment to 4.43.2 above, this additional entry to the DAG aims to highlight the difference between no 'fault' found and no 'cause' found.
For example incidents involving fleet or maintenance where a failure has occurred sometimes gets subsequently reported as no fault found when in fact it is the **cause** that isn't found – we usually know a fault existed with the equipment because it failed.
For example, a fire breaks out within a point motor and maintenance are unable to find the cause of that fire. No cause is found but the fault is still the fire within a point motor.

4.43.4

l.	The Train Operator staff are unable to find the reported train-related safety problem or can prove the report to be false.	FZ, M9 or TZ as appropriate to type of train	Operator of train concerned (F##*, M##* or T##*).
m.	Network Rail staff are unable to find the reported infrastructure related safety problem or can prove the report to be false.	J4 or as appropriate to reported problem	Network Rail (IQ**)

Further to the above additions, to ensure the responsibility of NFF is fully understood, this amendment has been added to clarify that even if a reported fault is 'proved' to be erroneous that the attribution of responsibility does still not change from what was reported.
For example, a driver reports an irregular signal sequence that after full testing and appropriate downloads proves the driver to be mistaken. The resulting delays are still related to a perceived and reported signal failure and responsibility should be Network Rail (IA delay code).

4.44 Guidance where No Fault is Found

4.44.1 *When considering resolution of incidents utilising this section, thought should be given to the distinct difference between 'no cause found' for an identified fault and 'no fault found' for a reported fault.*

This is the same wording and rationale as 4.43.3 above and just reiterates the principle in this section to ensure it is factored when discussing No Fault Found – and whether this section is wholly appropriate when resolving an incident.

Part 2: Process and Guidance Documents appended to the DAG

PGD1 – PRIME Cause definition / Examples
PGD2 – Reactionary Delay Attribution Examples
PGD3 – Y code application
PGD4 – Dispute and Resolution Process Guide
PGD5 – Delay Management TIN reattribution process

PGD1 – PRIME Cause definition / Examples

As you will all be aware, attribution should be made to PRIME cause but up until now that term had never been formally defined or published.
However, DAB are aware that just relying on 'words' in the DAG has sometimes caused more debate around interpretation so for that reason, DAB will now support certain entries with examples of application. Thus, within the PRIME cause brief there are a number of common scenarios that should be used for briefing or referencing.

PGD2 – Reactionary Delay Attribution Examples

Similar to PRIME cause, explanations on how to allocate reactionary delays (not the use of Y codes) has also been absent from the DAG; but is considered a critical element of the attribution process. Again, writing down a wordy 'how to' guide would probably not have added anything more than further confusion so it has been demonstrated with worked examples for what were considered the nine most common scenarios.

PGD3 – Y code application

Derived from the brief that supported the Y code changes for the April 2015 DAG it was considered to be of continued use for reference and thus included as a Process and Guidance Document.

PGD4 – Dispute and Resolution Process Guide

Emanating from feedback through to DAB from members and various DAB forums it was clear that DAB needed to define a guidance process for Operators and Network Rail Routes to refer to covering disputes and resolution principles.
Additionally if DAB were ever required to give guidance or assistance on process they would need such an agreed process to at least refer to.

PGD5 – Delay Management TIN reattribution process

Similar to PGD3 above this process was driven by feedback through to DAB from members and various DAB forums covering the concerns over not only the amount of Management TINs that were being created by Network Rail but more importantly the methodology for their reattribution. This process therefore sets out a process for the latter issue to not only set some timescales but improve the communication requirements between parties at the very least.
Work streams to deal with the need for creation of Management TINs is being progressed internally to Network Rail.

DAG SECTION 4 RENUMBERING REFERENCE GUIDE

OLD SECTION		NEW SECTION	SECTION TITLE
4.1	To	4.1	INTRODUCTION
4.2	To	4.17	ACCEPTANCE INTO OFF NETWORK FREIGHT TERMINALS/YARDS
4.3	To	4.8	ADHESION PROBLEMS INCLUDING LEAF-FALL
4.4	To	4.34	ANIMAL INCURSION, STRIKES AND INFESTATION
4.5	To	4.35	BRIDGE STRIKES
4.6	To	4.22	CANCELLATION OF FREIGHT SERVICES
4.7	To	4.2	DUPLICATE DELAYS
4.8	To	4.33	PLANNED AND EMERGENCY POSSESSIONS
4.9	To	4.32	ENGINEERS ON-TRACK EQUIPMENT AND ENGINEERING HAULAGE TRAIN FAILURE
4.10	To	4.36	FATALITIES AND INJURIES
4.11	To	4.37	FIRES (INCLUDING FALSE ALARMS)
4.12	To	4.10	FLEET EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
4.13	To	4.16	FLEET DEPOT DELAYS (INCLUDING MAJOR MAINTENANCE DEPOTS)
4.14	To	4.38	FLOODING
4.15	To	4.18	OFF - NETWORK FREIGHT TERMINAL OR YARD OR OTHER NON-NETWORK RAIL OPERATED INFRA DELAYS
4.16	To	4.28	INFRASTRUCTURE EQUIPMENT FAILURE
4.17	To	4.23	LATE START FROM ORIGIN
4.18	To	4.20	LOADING PROBLEMS
4.19	To	4.21	MARSHALLING OF TRAIN INCORRECT
4.20	To	4.42	MISHAPS AND MAJOR SAFETY INCIDENTS
4.21	To	4.3	'MINUTES DELAY' NOT APPARENTLY DUE TO NETWORK RAIL
4.22	To	4.4	TRUST BERTH ERRORS
4.23	To	4.25	REGULATION AND SIGNALLING OF TRAINS
4.24	To	4.43	SAFETY PROBLEMS REPORTED BY STAFF OR PUBLIC
4.25	To	4.44	GUIDANCE WHERE NO FAULT FOUND (TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT)
4.26	To	4.9	RAILHEAD CONDITIONING TRAINS
4.27	To	4.41	SECURITY ALERTS
4.28	To	4.27	STATION OPERATING DELAYS
4.29	To	4.29	TEMPORARY (INCLUDING EMERGENCY SPEED RESTRICTIONS)
4.30	To	4.7	THE SPECIAL TRAIN
4.31	To	4.26	TIMETABLE AND RESOURCE PLANNING ERRORS
4.32	To	4.30	TRACKSIDE SIGNS INCLUDING TSR/ESR BOARD DEFECTIVE/BLOWN DOWN
4.33	To	4.5	TRAINS INCURRING SEVERAL SMALL DELAYS
4.34	To	4.6	TRUST OUTAGES
4.35	To	4.39	VANDALISM, THEFT AND TRESPASS
4.36	To	4.24	WAITING TRAINCREW
4.37	To	4.40	WEATHER EFFECTS
4.38	To	4.31	WIRES DOWN AND OTHER OLE PROBLEMS
4.39	To	4.11	FAILURE OF TASS BALISE SYSTEM.
4.40	To	4.12	FAILURE OF ETCS/ERTMS BALISE SYSTEM
4.41	To	4.13	OPERATIONAL GSM-R RAILWAY EMERGENCY CALL (RECS)
4.42	To	4.14	OPERATIONAL GSM-R SYSTEMS – FAULTS OR FAILURES
4.43	To	4.15	ATTRIBUTION OF DELAY INCIDENTS CAUSED BY TPWS INTERVENTION OR FAILURE
4.44	To	4.19	NETWORK YARDS AND TERMINALS