April 2016 DAG

Briefing Document

For the attention of all staff who are involved in the Train Delay Attribution Process

Delay Attribution Board
Floor 8
1 Eversholt Street
London
NW1 2DN

INTRODUCTION

This brief supplements, and covers the key changes made within, the April 2016 DAG and also incorporates additional process and guidance documents developed by the DAB for improved understanding, application and consistency of the attribution process.

In terms of this April 2016 issue, the biggest single change is that all the sections have now been combined and renumbered (and a minor re-order). There are now 15 individual sections within Section 4 reduced from, what would have been, 46.

This is in line with the previously advised DAG overhaul for improved referencing and usability and should be the last major change of this nature as the current DAG layout will now allow for easier insertions or section alterations without full renumbering.

For ease of reference the section number changes are shown at the end of this brief.

This brief will therefore work through the DAG by its new referencing.

As you will be accustom to, some of the changes made to the DAG are just cosmetic or corrections such as amending grammar or minor errors from the previous version. These are shown in the DAG in the normal red font / lined margins but won't be covered in this brief.

Most importantly, the DAB have been reviewing (and will continue to review) the common areas of perceived misinterpretation of the DAG or areas that seem to cause the most 'debate' within the Industry – be it between Operators and Network Rail or indeed internally to the individual parties. Often, many of these 'debates' are just about understanding the principles (that, for many outside the attribution world, can admittedly seem perverse at times).

Therefore you will (hopefully) notice throughout this brief that many of the changes are about trying to drive that improved understanding. It is hoped that having some of the attribution principles set out in black and white, backed up by examples where appropriate, will go some way in reducing the amount of discussions that are occurring and drive more efficiency into the process.

Within this brief, the general briefing notes are in standard black and the DAG entries / references are in blue italics with some additional red used to highlight key changes where only parts of the entry have changed.

As always feedback on the DAG and these briefings is always welcome to ensure we continually improve with each issue.

Regards,

Mark Southon
Secretary to the DAB

Part 1: Key changes within the April 2016 DAG

Delay Code Changes

Below is a summary of the delay codes that have been removed, introduced or amended in the April 2016 DAG. An explanation for each is contained within the main body of the brief in the appropriate sections.

Delay Codes Removed

I3 - Obstruction on OHL, cause of which is not known
TU – Formal Inquiry Incident
FU – Formal Inquiry Incident
The above 'Formal Inquiry' Delay Codes are removed as part of the introduction of the 'Holding Code' process (OI was previously removed in the September 2015 DAG).

Delay Code Additions

J5 – Infrastructure Fault Proven to be Mistaken (MISTAKE REP)
OA – Regulation decision made with best endeavours (BESTEND REG)

And the following additions are all linked to the new Holding Code Process:-
DA - Non Technical Fleet Holding Code (HOLD NT FL)
DB - Train Operations Holding Code (HOLD T-OPS)
DC - Train Crew Causes Holding Code (HOLD T-CRW)
DD - Technical Fleet Holding Code (HOLD T FL)
DE - Station Causes Holding Code (HOLD STN)
DF - External Causes Holding Code (HOLD EXT)
DG - Freight Terminal and or Yard Holding Code (HOLD YARD)
DH - Adhesion and or Autumn Holding Code (HOLD AUTM)

Delay Code Alterations

J4 – Infrastructure Safety Issues Reported by Member of the Public – No Fault Found (MOP NFF)
R7 –Abbreviation 'SPEC EVENT' rather than 'SPORTS'
YX – Passenger overcrowding caused by delay or cancellation of another train or its own late running

SECTION 2: OVERVIEW OF DELAY ATTRIBUTION AND SYSTEM DEFINITIONS

Cross Route Regulation – new entry

2.6.17 D (new second bullet)
Where a Signalling Centre on Route or Management Area A controls signalling / train movements on Route or Management Area B any regulation incident should be coded to a Network Rail Manager Code of Route or Management Area B but with Responsibility assigned to Route or Management Area A

With the introduction of Rail Operations Centres (ROCs) there will be increased situations where train movements are managed by one Route's staff on another Route's infrastructure.
For the purpose of attribution the Network Rail Manager Code should still reflect the Route on which the delay occurred. However, for performance improvement purposes, the responsibility of the delay should be allocated to the party that can provide improvements for the future.

Prime Cause – new entry

2.7.1 The immediate cause or event that results in delay to a train is known as "Prime Cause". Until a Prime Cause has occurred there will be no delay to a train service. For the avoidance of doubt, "Prime Cause" cannot be a reaction to a previous incident. In addition, where a delay is caused by a human error or oversight then that delay should be considered as a potential new "Prime Cause". Examples of the Application of Prime Cause can be found in DAB Process and Guidance Document PGD1 (which can be found on the DAB website)

As referred to, this entry formalises the guidance given in DAB's Process Guide Document (PGD1).

SECTION 3: CATEGORIES OF TRUST DELAY CODE AND DEFAULT ATTRIBUTION

Further clarity to paragraph 3.1.6 overcrowding

3.1.6 If an operator's service is delayed due to overcrowding as a result of an operator's train either being cancelled, or delayed, any delay or cancellation is to be attributed to the prime cause of why the initial train was delayed, or cancelled. This also applies to a train running late in the path of the following train.

And associated clarification to the use of the YX reactionary delay code

YX - Passenger overcrowding caused by delay or cancellation of another train or its own late running

This amendment is aimed to clarify the situation where a train is running late and in the path of the following train and picks up the passengers of that train as well as its own.

To further explain:
Currently 3.1.6 covers if train A is late and running behind train B; then overcrowding to train B is allocated to train A's late running cause as train B has two train worth of passengers.
Similarly then; if train A is running late but in front of, and in the path of, train B (i.e. it arrives at the time train B should have arrived) then train A has the two train worth of passengers.
In essence, for both scenarios, it is the same cause and effect - one train has two train worth of passengers due to train A late running.
Where applied it would be considered appropriate to have this explained in the detail 'd' text for the delay.

SECTION 4: GUIDANCE ON RESPONSIBILITIES AND CODING OF DELAY INCIDENTS

Clarification and Amendments to Section 4.1.3 Joint Responsibility (see also PGD6 in Part 2)

4.1.3.5 For Joint Responsibility to be applicable for an incident at, or directly affecting a station both of the following criteria need to be met…….

Clarification that the incident has to be <u>directly</u> affecting the station (see also 4.1.3.7 below)

4.1.3.6 Only when both criteria have been met can the train incurring 'Minutes Delay' or cancellation be attributed to an incident with a D## Responsible Manager Code*

This clarifies that attribution to Joint Responsibility incidents should initially be based on the circumstances of the incident and then consider the characteristics of each train.
The table set out in DAB Process Guide Document 6 should assist.

4.1.3.7 In all cases the closure of access to the station must be undertaken by a responsible person (e.g. station manager, emergency services, MOM) and be reasonable and justified in the circumstances (in accordance to what is known at the time of decision). The closure times and reasoning for closure should be detailed in the incident freeform text. This would not include stations closed as a consequence of an incident remote from that station.

This sets out examples of a 'responsible person' and clarifies that stations closed as a consequence (i.e. not directly affected by the incident) should not be considered for Joint responsibility.

4.1.3.12 Joint responsibility criteria would NOT apply in any of the following circumstances:
- *Where ONLY the operation of the network is affected*
- *Where the source of the incident originates from or directly affects the station (see 4.1.3.13) but does NOT affect the network or its operation*
- *Where the source of the incident originates on a train (e.g. fire on board, suspect package on board, person alighting direct to track)*
- *Where the source of the incident originates in or on operational infrastructure equipment (signalling, OHLE or track)*
- *Where the source of the incident originates from works being carried out on the operational infrastructure (signalling, OHLE or track) within the station*
- *Where the station access to passengers is affected / prevented by default (e.g. station closed only due to no trains running or resulting overcrowding)*

This paragraph / section was rewritten to better describe the situations where Joint Responsibility should NOT apply as some of the wording in the original was giving cause for extended debate; particularly incidents on trains and those that originate on the infrastructure - which should remain wholly with the responsible party regardless of subsequent circumstances.
E.g. a fire in a point motor in the confines of a station that causes that station to be evacuated remains fully Network Rail responsibility.

Additionally, the following paragraph has been added to all relevant sections of the DAG (fatalities, weather, fires, security alerts et al) to refer the user to this section 4.1.3

In the scenarios listed in the table above there may be occasion where both track access is denied to trains entering or passing through a station and the access of passengers is denied to the station (or booked platform) and to / from those trains. In these circumstances joint responsibility may be applicable so refer to 4.1.3 for further guidance.

Expansion of Failure to Mitigate in Section 4.1.5.2

4.1.5.3   If Network Rail or Train Operator considers the other party has failed to mitigate in line with 4.1.5.1 and 4.1.5.2 above, any subsequent attribution should then be made in line with the following:-
- *Any perceived failings of either party during an incident shall be highlighted in real time during the incident or event to which that failure is cited.*
- *Demonstration that a recovery plan was agreed / implemented and where that plan was not delivered.*
- *Demonstration that regular updates / conferences were held throughout the incident with plan adjustments agreed as appropriate.*
- *Identification where something could or should have been done; that wasn't (not necessarily part of any agreement)*
- *The reason for the failure to mitigate was demonstrated and stated in any incident created. Referencing where time deadlines / trains / actions contravene any agreement for service recovery arrangements.*
- *Individual trains should be highlighted if they alone fall short of the agreed contingency plans – this makes for easier checking / challenging.*
- *Cognisance taken if there is more than one incident ongoing on the affected line of route / area*
- *Any incident attributed as a 'failure to mitigate' should be coded to the party's Operational Control code and NOT the code of the causal incident*

This element of the DAG has been expanded to help support previous guidance given by the DAB in how to identify and attribute delays considered to be as a result of a failure to mitigate by any party. The critical element being that any 'failure to mitigate' should be identified and cited on the day (by any Party) with the relevant communications made real time. Any incident created / disputed as a result should then contain all the relevant information to enable full review and / or challenge. For example one party should not cite that another party did not do 'X' when 'X' was neither requested, discussed or highlighted real time.

Clarification to GSM-R REC responsibility

4.4.4.1c

c)	*REC initiated by a non-Track Access Party from off the Network Rail network (Where the unit / loco aren't registered to a Track Access Party).*	*XZ*	*Network Rail (XQ**)*

This amendment is to clarify that where a unit or loco is off the Network Rail network and a REC is initiated but that unit or loco is not registered to an Access Party then attribution would be to an External Responsibility to Network Rail.
In essence, it is clarifying that where the unit or loco is registered to an Access Party and a REC occurs off the Network Rail network (e.g. when under maintenance by a third party) the responsibility still remains with the Train Operator to ensure the relevant equipment is isolated.

TPWS activation clarification

4.4.6.1

a.	*TPWS Over Speed Intervention; or Train Stop Intervention against danger aspect.*	*TG* *FC*	*Train Operator* *(T##*)(F##*)*
e.	*TPWS TSS Intervention against proceed aspect or indication*	*IJ*	*Network Rail (IQ**)*

This amendment (a) and addition (e) sets out to clarify the difference between TPWS activations against a 'danger' or 'proceed' signal aspect that has previously caused debate in the resolution process.

Train Crew Provision Clarification

4.7.2.1   Delays or cancellations caused by train crew late booking on duty for whatever reason is the responsibility of the train operator and should be allocated to a new prime cause incident. This includes circumstances where train crew are 'after rest' due to an incident on their previous turn of duty and also including Lodging Turns where the member of crew books off and back on again.

This amendment was introduced following a Request for Guidance around Lodging Turns. It sets out to clarify that provision of train crew is the responsibility of the Operator and that booking on late due to an incident on their previous turn of duty should not be associated with that incident. The overnight break between duties on a lodging turn is to be treated in the same vein as a new turn of duty and thus Operator responsibility.

Additionally 4.7.2.3(a) has also been clarified to state YJ applies when the crew are on the same turn of duty (i.e. not lodging turns / previous day turns)

4.7.2.3(a)

a	If the Train Operator confirms that the train crew were working a late inward service (on same turn of duty) and both incoming and outgoing services are the responsibility of the same operator.	YJ	Attribute to principal TRUST Incident causing inward train to be late

Regulation and Signalling of Trains Clarification

The entire section on regulation and signalling of trains has been reviewed and amended as it was highlighted as one of the areas of most debate in attribution and resolution and potentially the topic with the most emotion.

The amendments and additions therefore set out below are hoped to go some way in assisting attribution, dispute and resolution of regulating decisions.

The key elements of the changes are the regulating considerations set out under 4.8.3, which were developed through the DAB with guidance and assistance from a Network Rail Operations Manager, and most importantly the introduction of a new OA delay code (explained below).

The revised 4.8.1 below sets out the appropriate use for OB delay code which now stipulates where the regulation was against any instructions in place at that regulating location or where a slower running train has been allowed to proceed and there is no reasonable justification for the decision.

4.8.1   Where a train has been held at a regulating point for another train or, if a train is delayed following a slower running train that has been allowed to proceed, and for no other given reason, this is against the agreed Regulating Instructions for that location, the 'Minutes Delay' should be coded OB (or OD if this is by direction of the Route Control) and attributed to Network Rail (OQ**). Note – Regulating Instructions will vary across the network from either specific location or specific train instructions to more general guidance such as 'for PPM'

Paragraph 4.8.2 remains broadly unchanged and is not included here.

Paragraph 4.8.3 (below) is a completely new entry which is designed to generate considerations in the review of regulating decisions prior to disputing / accepting related delays. It is expected that discussions around regulation under this 4.8.3 are therefore not as clear as set out in 4.8.1 and therefore OB delay code would not be appropriate.

4.8.3   Where general Regulating Instructions are given to signallers (e.g. regulate for PPM) there may be occasions where the regulation is deemed appropriate at that point in time but could have greater unforeseen impact outside that signaller's operational sphere.
When reviewing such regulating decisions the reviewer should consider the following points prior to reaching their conclusion:-

- *Is the regulation carried out in line with the Regulation Instruction for that location (PPM, FPM, Right Time or overall delay) – any attribution responsibility decision should be based on the same consideration.*

- *If any train(s) ultimately fails PPM, cognisance needs to be given to the distance travelled and other influences on that train post regulation.*

- *Can the impact of 'what may have happened' if the regulation was reversed be ably demonstrated?*

- *Could any subsequent events (further regulation / interactions) occurring after the regulation be realistically factored into the regulating decision?*

- *Can the rationale of the decision be provided by a representative of the controlling location, demonstrating why an alternative option was not taken?*

- *Would the regulation be considered appropriate if all affected trains were run by one Operator?*

If after due consideration the regulation is deemed to be within the Regulation Instructions for that location but the impact is considered to be greater than if the regulation decision had been reversed then the resulting 'Minutes 'Delay' should be coded OA (or OD if direction of Route Control) and attributed to Network Rail (OQ**)

If after consideration the reactionary impact to the regulation is considered to be of similar impact regardless of the decision made then the principles set out in 4.8.2 should apply.

OA	Regulation decision made with best endeavours	BESTEND REG

The new OA delay code has been introduced for three reasons

1. It will distinguish regulation that is not covered within any specific instructions that can be demonstrated to have caused increased Industry delay or unnecessary PPM failures.
2. Citing 'Best Endeavours' removes some of the emotion of using OB for such scenarios (which many signallers still regard as 'wrong reg')
3. If used correctly, all regulating decisions coded to OA should be reviewed and utilised to drive local operating discussions to make changes to the regulating instructions for the identified locations and trains – thus driving performance improvement opportunities.

Paragraphs 4.8.4 to 4.8.8 covering mis-routing, ARS and early running trains remain unchanged.

Provision of Stock (TOC) and Specified Equipment (FOC)

This new Section to the DAG (4.9.2) has been introduced to assist with appropriate considerations, discussion and attribution of circumstances originating from the provision of stock. It has been split to TOC and FOC as it was identified through discussions that there are distinct differences and thus generic wording would not be appropriate to cover both.

Cognisance obviously needs to be taken where an incident occurs just prior to, or is ongoing past, the 22.00 cut off time – i.e. is there opportunity for the parties to agree a revised plan / recovery of stock?

4.9.2.1 PROVISION OF STOCK (PASSENGER OPERATORS)

4.9.2.2 It is the responsibility of the Train Operator to provide the diagrammed rolling stock (length / type) as per the agreed plan at 22.00 the day prior to operation.

Delays or cancellations caused by either
- *the non-provision of stock or;*
- *the provision of non-diagrammed stock type*

for whatever reason should be allocated to a new prime cause incident. This includes circumstances where stock is damaged or displaced.

4.9.2.3 Exceptions:

No.	Circumstances	Delay Code	Incident Attribution
a	Stock change or provision of different stock (length, capacity, capability) to that specified in the diagram is due to an incident that occurs post agreement of the plan of that day (22:00 - see 3.1.5) or, if by agreement, between Network Rail and the Operator(s) the schedules will not be amended.	As appropriate to incident causing change	As appropriate to incident causing change
b	Operator made viable mitigation request (prior to 22:00) to amend the plan of day or required stock repositioning moves which is declined by NR (e.g. .no paths, possession). (This clause only applies where prior viable opportunity did not exist)	As appropriate to incident causing requirement	As appropriate to incident causing requirement
c	Where an agreed mitigation timetable plan contains conflicts, errors or omissions (see 4.9.1.1 / 4.9.1.2)	OD / QN	Network Rail (O##* / Q##*)
d	Where an agreed mitigation resource plan (crew / stock) contains conflicts, errors or omissions (see 4.7.2.1 and 4.9.2.1)	T*	Operator (T##*)

4.9.2.4 PROVISION OF SPECIFIED EQUIPMENT (FREIGHT OPERATORS)

4.9.2.5 It is the responsibility of the Freight Operator to provide suitable Specified Equipment (locomotives/vehicles) to meet the operating characteristics of the planned Train Slot (whether WTT, STP, VSTP)

Delays or cancellations caused by either

- *the non-provision of Specified Equipment or;*
- *the provision of Specified Equipment that cannot meet the operating characteristics of the planned Train Slot. For whatever reason should be allocated to a new prime cause incident. This includes circumstances where specified equipment is damaged or displaced.*

4.9.2.6 Exceptions:

No.	Circumstances	Delay Code	Incident Attribution
a	Provision of specified equipment that cannot meet the operational characteristics of the planned Train Slot (whether WTT, STP, VSTP) due to an incident that occurs post agreement of the Train Slot for that train.	As appropriate to incident causing change	As appropriate to incident causing change
b	Operator made viable mitigation request to amend the Train Slot for that train (including the redeployment of specified equipment) which are declined by NR (e.g. no paths, conflicting possession etc.). (This clause only applies where prior viable opportunity did not exist)	As appropriate to incident causing requirement	As appropriate to incident causing requirement
c	Where an agreed mitigation plan (e.g. a revised Train Slot under MFSdD) contains conflicts, errors or omissions (see 4.26.1 / 4.26.2)	OD / Q*	Network Rail (O##* / Q##*)
d	Where an agreed mitigation plan contains conflicts, errors or omissions in respect of resources (Specified Equipment/train crew) (see 4.24.1 and 4.27.4)	F* / M*	Operator (F##* / M##*)

(For the purposes of this Section, "Specified Equipment" means freight railway vehicles (i.e. locomotives and wagons)

Service Recovery and Contingency Plans

A new Section to the DAG (4.10) has been introduced and will be further developed to assist in driving appropriate considerations, discussion and attribution of circumstances originating from service recovery / contingency plan initiation.
The first element to be included is that of train crew diversionary route knowledge.

4.10.1

a	*Train is requested to be diverted in line with pre-agreed contingency plans but train crew do not have the required route knowledge*	*FH / TI*	*Operator of train unable to be diverted (F##* / T##*)*
b	*Train is requested to be diverted over a route that is not included in pre- agreed contingency plans and crew do not have required route knowledge*	*As appropriate to incident causing diversion request*	*As appropriate to incident causing diversion request*

This new entry sets out the principle for where there are pre-agreed ('off the shelf') contingency plans agreed and signed by Network Rail and Operators in that there is an expectation that those plans should be able to be implemented on requirement.
Discussions through DAB has suggested that, where appropriate, plans should not only reflect what can be delivered but also include relevant caveats / exceptions – for example if the contingency plan state trains will be diverted via X and not all train crew depots sign via X then that needs to be stated in the plans – this will ensure on the day of execution the relevant Controls will be aware of any limitations in implementing the plan.
The second element covers situations where a request is made to divert a train (e.g. for a line blockage ahead) but the driver does not sign the route and it is not in any agreed plans – in this situation attribution should be to the line blocking incident and not considered a new incident.
Similar to the Regulation changes above (including OA) this is a development attempting to use attribution to drive performance improvement – rather than attribution being used as the downstream debating shop for decisions other parts of the Industry should be leading on.

IBJ to IRJ Terminology and IRJ Failure

To bring the DAG up to date with current terminology and prescribing that any IRJ failure whether causing a TCF or not should still be classed as a track fault (IS) – the TCF being the symptom.

4.12.1.3(b)
b) Insulated Rail Joint Failures ("IRJs" sometimes referred to as "IBJs")

- *Any failure of the IRJ should be attributed as a Track Fault (coded IS), whether it causes a track circuit to fail or a track fault.*

Clarification on Responsibility of DOO Monitors and Level Crossing CCTV

Clarification in the DAG to confirm that CCTV at Level Crossings and DOO Monitors (those maintained by NR) are both the responsibility of Telecoms (and not Maintenance)

4.12.1.7 Telecom Equipment Failure (amended bullets)

- *Level Crossing – telecoms cable feed to DOO CCTV (note – CCTV equipment at level crossings itself is "signalling"*
- *Station platform DOO CCTV / monitors/ mirrors (where NR Telecoms responsibility)*

The following associated reference has also been amended:-

*4.12.1.13 The code **IK** should be used for failure of the DOO monitors that are maintained by Network Rail*

I3 Delay Code Removal

As part of the ongoing delay code reviews it was identified that I3 was rarely utilised and when it was used it was more for a 'doesn't fit elsewhere'. Predominantly balloons and kites in the OHLE were included but these were deemed to have a known reason for being there. Whilst it does not have to be extreme weather (wind), the fact that they emanate external to the railway should classify such occurrences as an X code.
I3 as prescribed 'cause not known' was also seen as a slight misnomer.

4.12.1.11 (part)
Obstruction of the overhead wires or third rail should be allocated to the reason for the item being there, i.e. weather, vandalism, trespass or items which have been thrown or have fallen from a train.

And an associated change in 4.12.4 'Wires Down..':-

4.12.4.2 (c)

c.	Miscellaneous items on the OHLE	Appropriate to item / cause	Network Rail (IQ** / XQ**)

Staff Errors (JL) and Infrastructure Other (IZ)

This new entry, in two parts and requested by Network Rail, aims to reduce the inconsistency and erroneous use of JL and IZ delay codes and to formally match their current internal guidance.

4.12.1.17 Staff Errors (Delay Code JL)

*Staff errors (delay code **JL**) should only be utilised:-*
- *When there is a confirmed staff error which causes damage and an immediate failure of an asset (e.g. cable cut by contractor)*
- *When failure is caused by direct action or by not following standards and or procedure*

*Staff errors should **not** be considered for:-*
- *A subsequent reactionary failure (e.g. tracing a fault in a location cabinet that causes a TCF due to a loose wire).*
- *A fault that manifests itself after 24 hours of train running from any work being carried out (which is to be considered an asset failure)*

4.12.1.18 Infrastructure Other (Delay Code IZ)

- Delay code **IZ** should **NOT** be used:-
- Where a delay code exists that represents the cause
- Because there is no FMS number recorded
- For repeat failures
- Design limitations
- For TRUST incidents that should have been merged to the original failure incident

TSR / ESR clarification

Driven by both Network Rail internal discussions and Operator challenges, this section has been fully reviewed and amended to assist in gaining improved consistency of attribution to speed restrictions.

Paragraphs 4.12.2.1 and 4.12.2.2 (not shown here) have been slightly updated to improve clarification on the creation of TSR / ESR incidents with a note that when attributing to ESRs cognisance needs to be given to time loss prior to the speed boards being erected.
The main change, and a new addition, being a new paragraph 4.12.2.3 (below) which sets out the appropriate and expected use of the Network Delay facility.

4.12.2.3   For situations covered in both 4.12.2.1 and 4.12.2.2 a Network Delay shall be initiated except where the class of trains or running lines cannot be distinguished (e.g. 4 track railway where all classes of train run on all lines to a sufficient degree that applying network delays would lead to material misallocation of delay).
Where a specific class of train will be affected and runs solely (or almost entirely) on one line then the Network Delay shall be utilised.
Network Delay shall be initiated for all delays expected of 1 minute and above.
Where Network Delay cannot be initiated, an appropriate incident should be created and where practicable and cost effective the appropriate delay should be attributed to the relevant incidents. However the relevant time loss shall be allocated where that delay is part of an above threshold delay required to be explained.

The situations described in the table in 4.12.2.4 have also been updated (although not included here). However, the important factor being the altered notes appended to the table as below:-

Note: The term **w**ithin the Engineering Access Statement (EAS) used above should be interpreted to mean that there is sufficient engineering allowance in the schedule that is:-
- Previously unused
- In the same Engineering Section as the restriction / delay

And, In the case of Condition of Track/Earthworks/Structures:-
- The reason for the speed restriction is declared in the Engineering Access Statement (EAS) and the Timetable Planning Rules.

The above clarifies two key aspects – that the engineering allowance needs to be in the same Engineering Section as the delay incurred and, obviously, that it is not already utilised.

Animal Incursion

This section has been introduced after a Request for Guidance highlighted that the DAG only covered animal strikes, despite the section heading, and that incursion was in many ways needed to be viewed differently.

Whilst there was much debate over the conditions set out below it was agreed that the DAG has to reflect the Rule Book as it currently stands.

Ultimately the delay responsibility is based upon how the issue is reported and reacted to.

If in (a) the reporter believes that the incursion is a Safety of the Line incident – e.g. a possible risk of a dog owner being in the vicinity or a risk of unit shoes being disabled if the animal was struck then, if **reported as such**, the attribution principles in flowchart 4.14.1.3 should apply.

If, as in (b), the reporter does **not** report the incident as a Safety of the Line, e.g. retrospective report of a dog on the line to explain the delay then the responsibility for that delay remains with the Operator of the train.

Scenario (c) sets out that if the Signaller receives a report that is **not** Safety of the Line but still cautions trains (i.e. not in line with the Rule Book) then the delay responsibility sits with the Signaller.

4.14.1.8 Animal Incursion

4.14.1.8.1 In instances of animal incursion that do not result in an animal strike as set out in 4.14.1.7 above, attribution should be applied as to how the incursion was reported and action taken by the appropriate person in line with current Rules and Regulations

No.	Circumstances	Delay Code	Incident Attribution
a.	*Animal incursion reported as a safety of the line incident. Delay occurs to reporting train and any subsequent cautioning.*	*I8 / X8 in line with rationale in 4.14.1.7*	*Network Rail (IQ** / XQ**).*
b.	*Animal incursion reported by driver (not as safety of line). Delay occurs to reporting train.*	*TG / FC*	*Operator of train involved (T##*/F##*)*
c.	*Animal incursion reported (not reported as safety of the line per current Rules). No delay to reporting train but delay occurs to subsequent train(s).*	*OC*	*Network Rail (OQ**)*

Note: Safety of the Line in this circumstance is deemed to be where the reporting person believes there is potential risk to the safety of their train, other trains, any persons on those train or the overall safe operation of the railway.

Ice / Frost OHLE Flow Diagram

Driven by both Network Rail internal discussions and Operator challenges, this section has been reviewed and amended to assist in gaining improved consistency of incidents involving OHLE / Pantograph interface in 'icy' conditions.

The flow diagram in **4.14.5.9** (left hand side as shown below) has been updated to improve the logic and hopefully simplifying by combining OHLE and 3rd Rail issues.
Additional supporting notes (shown) have been added to aid how parties could 'demonstrate' ice being experienced as well as ensuring any known issues with infrastructure or units / locos are factored in resolution.

N.B 1. The term 'demonstrated' in this flowchart shall be considered to include, but not restricted to, the following:
Real time Driver report of failure; Forward Facing CCTV; PAN Cam; Downloads showing power draw down / loss of power; fleet report; RVIE report.

N.B 2 Where there is a pre-agreed issue affecting either the infrastructure or rolling stock then the relevant arm of the flowchart should be used.

Clarification of J4 / J5 Delay Code Usage

This change, requested by Network Rail, aims to reduce the inconsistency and perceived misunderstanding of the current J4 delay code.

The opportunity was not only taken to clarify the relevant use of J4 but to expand the circumstances further and differentiate between staff / public reports and importantly the differences between No Fault Found and No Fault Proven.

J4 has therefore been re-classified to capture reports from members of the public (where no fault is found)

J5 has been introduced to capture reports where reports are **proven** to be mistaken using current technology such as FFCCTV (but **not** no fault found)

(No fault found after reports from Industry staff remain coded to the asset reported against)

The relevant entries in Section 5 being:-

J4	*Infrastructure Safety Issue Reported by Member of Public – No Fault Found*	*MOP NFF*
J5	*Infrastructure Fault Report Proven to be mistaken*	*MISTAKE REP*

The scenarios therefore emanating from the above delay code changes are shown below;-

4.15.2.4

f.	*No fault can be found or no cause is apparent for any reported signalling anomaly or change of aspect.* *(For report proven to be mistaken see 'o' below)*	*IA*	*Network Rail (IQ**)*
m.	*Network Rail is unable to find the infrastructure related safety problem – No Fault Found (when reported by Industry staff / contractors)*	*As appropriate to reported asset*	*Network Rail (IQ**)*
n.	*Network Rail is unable to find the infrastructure related safety problem (when reported by a member of the public)*	*J4*	*Network Rail (IQ**)*
o.	*Network Rail is able to categorically prove (via FFCCTV or the like) that the infrastructure related safety report is mistaken (NOT No Fault Found – see m)*	*J5*	*Network Rail (IQ**)*

New Holding Codes Section and Process

This is the most significant of all the changes, bringing a whole new concept into the DAG. The Holding Code principle came out of the Chairman's Review of 2014 as a much needed avenue of capturing incidents that are considered in need of Formal Inquiry or similar.

Utilising the Holding Code process should therefore:-
- Enable easy identification of any incidents that are subject to such inquiries due to the specific coding utilised
- Ensure that both parties 'share' impact / reporting responsibility until such time as the incident is resolved to either party

The changes in the DAG are shown below and are supported by a new Process Guide Document (PGD7 – supplementing this briefing document) that sets out the full conditions / process of use for these new codes.

4.15.4.1 This section covers incidents where a cause is not initially apparent and that require formal investigation by RAIB, Independent or Industry Bodies (persons outside of the parties involved) and should ONLY be used as a temporary coding and NOT final resolution
The use of the D* Codes (Holding Codes) should be restricted to the following circumstances:-
- *Incidents that are being investigated by the RAIB*
- *Incidents that are being investigated by an independent party*
- *Incidents where the events have destroyed obvious evidence*
- *Incidents that require forensic investigation*
- *Incidents that involve a train/infrastructure interface.*
  - *OHLE/Pantograph*
  - *SPADs*
  - *Object Strikes*
  - *Derailments*
  - *3rd Rail shoe interface*
- *Incidents that have occurred on or directly affecting the Network within any of the criteria stated above*
- *Incidents where Network Rail and at least one other track access party is involved within any of the above criteria stated.*

4.15.4.2   When authorised to use a Holding Code the relevant D* should be utilised representing the same KPI as that of the current Delay Code mapping to ensure correct data mapping whilst the investigation is ongoing.
4.15.4.3   Once the investigation is concluded the incident should be re-allocated to the relevant delay code and responsible party.

The key aspects to note are:-
- Use of a Holding Code has to be agreed by the authorising person from both parties involved
- Holding Codes should only be used for Formal / Independent Inquiries or similar
- The Holding Code whilst utilised will be designated Joint Responsibility
- No incident in a D* Holding Code can be accepted (A system change prevents this)
- The Holding Codes can therefore never be used for final resolution
- The freeform should set out what is expected, from whom and when to resolve to cause.
- All the Holding Code delay codes match the relevant KPIs to maintain accurate reporting:-

CODE	CAUSE	ABBREVIATION
DA	Non Technical Fleet Holding Code	HOLD NT FL
DB	Train Operations Holding Code	HOLD T-OPS
DC	Train Crew Causes Holding Code	HOLD T-CRW
DD	Technical Fleet Holding Code	HOLD T FL
DE	Station Causes Holding Code	HOLD STN
DF	External Causes Holding Code	HOLD EXT
DG	Freight Terminal and or Yard Holding Code	HOLD YARD
DH	Adhesion and or Autumn Holding Code	HOLD AUTM

As covered earlier, delay codes FU and TU are now removed from the DAG

As part of the introduction of the Holding Codes, DAB will be monitoring and reviewing application.

SECTION 5: ACCESS TO TRUST MAINFRAME INCIDENT INFORMATION
Removed from the DAG

SECTION 6: TRUST INCIDENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
Removed from the DAG

It is anticipated that a new basic TRUST / WINVV Guide (replacing both Section 5 and 6) will be uploaded onto the DAB Website to coincide with the go-live of the new DAG

SECTION 7: APPENDIX A – DELAY CODES
This section is renumbered to SECTION 5

A wider review of the descriptions / abbreviations will be undertaken shortly.

Part 2: Process and Guidance Documents appended to the DAG

PGD1 – PRIME Cause definition / Examples
Issued September 2015
This Process Guide formally defines the term 'Prime Cause' (now added to the April 2016 DAG)
It is supported with examples of application by a number of common scenarios that should be used for briefing or referencing.

PGD2 – Reactionary Delay Attribution Examples
Reissued January 2016
This Process Guide contains explanations on how to allocate reactionary delays being a critical element of the attribution process. They are demonstrated with worked examples for what are considered the most common scenarios.

PGD3 – Y code application
Issued September 2015 – DAG references updated April 2016
This Guide was derived from the brief that supported the Y code changes for the April 2015 DAG.
It contains descriptions of all the Y codes and examples of usage.

PGD4 – Dispute and Resolution Process Guide
Issued September 2015
This Guidance Process was designed for Operators and Network Rail Routes to refer to covering disputes and resolution principles to enable timely attribution and resolution.

PGD5 – Delay Management TIN reattribution process
Issued September 2015
This Process Guide was designed for the reattribution of Management TINs including appropriate actions and timescales. It sets out there needs to be a common understanding of communication requirements between parties.

PGD6 – Joint Responsibility
Issued January 2016 – DAG references updated April 2016
This Guidance Document sets out what does and doesn't constitute Joint Responsibility and provides a reference table for the attribution of individual trains when joint responsibility criteria has been determined. Additionally it sets out some common examples of when Joint Responsibility does and doesn't apply to aid understanding.
It supports the clarification changes made in the April 2016 DAG.

PGD7 – Holding Code - NEW
Issued March 2016 (For April 2016 Go-Live)
This guidance document sets out the appropriate use and processes to be applied by all Parties when considering an incident for Holding Code status.
It prescribes what scenarios should and shouldn't be considered for a Holding Code.
It gives guidance on the process to follow should a Holding Code be agreed including the authorised persons and incident freeform
It prescribes the Holding Code will be a Joint Responsibility but that system limitations will prevent acceptance of any incident in a Holding Code
It sets out that the Delay Attribution Board will be monitoring usage to understand both its effectiveness and correct usage.

ALL THE PROCESS AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS CAN BE FOUND ON THE DAB WEBSITE
(PGD3 and PGD6 have been updated with the new DAG references but not re-distributed)

DAG SECTION 4 RENUMBERING REFERENCE GUIDE – APRIL 2016

OLD REF		NEW REF	SECTION TITLE (BOLD INDICATES MAIN SECTION HEADERS)
4.1	To	**4.1**	**INTRODUCTION**
NEW		**4.2**	**TRUST DATA AND RECORDING OF DELAYS**
4.2	To	4.2.1	DUPLICATE DELAYS
4.3	To	4.2.2	'MINUTES DELAY' NOT APPARENTLY DUE TO NETWORK RAIL
4.4	To	4.2.3	TRUST BERTH ERRORS
4.5	To	4.2.4	TRAINS INCURRING SEVERAL SMALL DELAYS
4.6	To	4.2.5	TRUST OUTAGES
4.7	To	4.2.6	THE SPECIAL TRAIN
NEW		**4.3**	**ADHESION, AUTUMN AND RAILHEAD TREATMENT INCIDENTS**
4.8	To	4.3.1	ADHESION PROBLEMS INCLUDING LEAF-FALL
4.9	To	4.3.2	RAILHEAD CONDITIONING TRAINS
NEW		**4.4**	**FLEET AND INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS INTERFACE INCIDENTS**
4.10	To	4.4.1	FLEET EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
4.11	To	4.4.2	FAILURE OF TASS BALISE SYSTEM.
4.12	To	4.4.3	FAILURE OF ETCS/ERTMS BALISE SYSTEM
4.13	To	4.4.4	OPERATIONAL GSM-R RAILWAY EMERGENCY CALL (RECS)
4.14	To	4.4.5	OPERATIONAL GSM-R SYSTEMS – FAULTS OR FAILURES
4.15	To	4.4.6	ATTRIBUTION OF DELAY INCIDENTS CAUSED BY TPWS INTERVENTION OR FAILURE
NEW		**4.5**	**DEPOTS, YARDS AND SIDINGS INCIDENTS**
4.16	To	4.5.1	FLEET DEPOT DELAYS (INCLUDING MAJOR MAINTENANCE DEPOTS)
4.17	To	4.5.2	ACCEPTANCE INTO OFF NETWORK FREIGHT TERMINALS/YARDS
4.18	To	4.5.3	OFF - NETWORK FREIGHT TERMINAL OR YARD OR OTHER NON-NETWORK RAIL …
4.19	To	4.5.4	NETWORK YARDS AND TERMINALS
NEW		**4.6**	**FREIGHT OPERATION INCIDENTS**
4.20	To	4.6.1	LOADING PROBLEMS
4.21	To	4.6.2	INCORRECT MARSHALLING OF TRAINS
4.22	To	4.6.3	CANCELLATION OF FREIGHT SERVICES
NEW		**4.7**	**LATE STARTS AND CREW RESOURCING INCIDENTS**
4.23	To	4.7.1	LATE START FROM ORIGIN
4.24	To	4.7.2	WAITING TRAIN CREW
4.25	To	**4.8**	**REGULATION AND SIGNALLING OF TRAINS**
4.26	To	**4.9**	**TIMETABLE AND RESOURCE PLANNING ERRORS**
NEW		4.9.2	STOCK PROVISION
NEW		**4.10**	**SERVICE RECOVERY AND CONTINGENCY PLANS**
4.27	To	**4.11**	**STATION OPERATING DELAYS**
NEW		**4.12**	**INFRASTRUCTURE INCIDENTS**
4.28	To	4.12.1	INFRASTRUCTURE EQUIPMENT FAILURE
4.29	To	4.12.2	TEMPORARY AND EMERGENCY SPEED RESTRICTIONS
4.30	To	4.12.3	TRACKSIDE SIGNS INCLUDING TSR/ESR BOARD DEFECTIVE/BLOWN DOWN
4.31	To	4.12.4	WIRES DOWN AND OTHER OHLE PROBLEMS
NEW		**4.13**	**POSSESSION AND INFRASTRUCTURE TRAINS INCIDENTS**
4.32	To	4.13.1	ENGINEERS ON-TRACK EQUIPMENT AND ENGINEERING HAULAGE TRAIN FAILURE
4.33	To	4.13.2	PLANNED AND EMERGENCY POSSESSIONS
NEW		**4.14**	**EXTERNAL IMPACT INCIDENTS**
4.34	To	4.14.1	ANIMAL INCURSION, STRIKES AND INFESTATION
4.35	To	4.14.2	BRIDGE STRIKES
4.36	To	4.14.3	FATALITIES AND INJURIES
4.39	To	4.14.4	VANDALISM, THEFT AND TRESPASS
4.40	To	4.14.5	WEATHER EFFECTS
4.38	To	4.14.6	FLOODING
4.41	To	4.14.7	SECURITY ALERTS
4.37	To	4.14.8	FIRES (INCLUDING FALSE ALARMS)
NEW		**4.15**	**SAFETY REPORTING, INVESTIGATION AND NO FAULT FOUND INCIDENTS**
4.42	To	4.15.1	MISHAPS AND MAJOR SAFETY INCIDENTS
4.43	To	4.15.2	SAFETY PROBLEMS REPORTED BY STAFF OR PUBLIC
4.44	To	4.15.3	GUIDANCE WHERE NO FAULT FOUND (TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT)
NEW		4.15.4	HOLDING CODES